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CASE COMMENTS
LIABILITY INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND SUITS FOR
INTENTIONAL INJURY
The typical liability insurance policy contains a clause by which
the insurer agrees to defend any suit alleging bodily injury or property
damage which is payable under the terms of the policy even though
the suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent.1 Another standard provision states that the policy does not apply to bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured.2 With these provisions in the insured's policy, does the
insurer have a duty to defend when a third person brings an action
against the insured alleging that the insured wilfully, maliciously,
brutally, and intentionally assaulted him?
In Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co.3 the insured, Gray, was involved in a
near accident with Jones. Jones got out of his car and approached
Gray's automobile in a menacing manner jerking open the car door.
Gray, apprehensive of harm to himself, thereupon struck Jones. Jones
sued Gray alleging that Gray had wilfully, maliciously, brutally, and
intentionally assaulted him. Gray's insurer, relying upon the intentional-injury exclusionary clause, refused to defend the suit. Gray unsuccessfully defended on the theory of self-defense and a judgment
was awarded in Jones' favor. Gray then brought this action against
the insurer for its refusal to defend.
'See McDonald v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 224 F. Supp. 369, 371-72 (D.R.I. 1963).
The inclusion of the duty to defend provision in the same sentence that contains
the bodily injury and property damage coverages was a deliberate choice by the
drafters of the policy. "This was done to ... reinforce the expression of intent...
that the obligation to defend suits against the insured is confined to those suits
which allege facts which are within the policy coverage and on the basis of which
the company will be obligated to pay damages if a judgment is recovered against
the insured." Risjord 9- Austin, Standard Automobile Policy, 1957 INs. L.J. 199, 200.
11-Iarbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F.2d 748 (loth Cir. 1962); Aetna
Cas. &.Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499 (5 th Cir. 1955); McDonald v. Great Am. Ins.
Co., 224 F. Supp. 369 (D.R.I. 1963); Abbott v. Western Nat'l Indem. Co., 165 Cal.
App. 2d 302, 331 P.2d 997 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Blackwood v. Farley, 40 Misc. 2d
289, 243 N.Y.S.ad 138 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Joyce Apartments, Inc. v. Weinstock, 15 Misc.
2d 47, 181 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1958); MacDonald v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 21o Ore.
395, 311 P.2d 425 (1957); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Newsom, 352 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961); Wendall v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 123 Vt. 294, 187 A.2d 331 (1963);
Alm v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 369 P.2d 216 (Wyo. 1962).
'54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (1966).
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The lower court held that the insurer had no duty to defend stating that where the third-party complaint shows on its face that the
injury is excluded from policy coverage no duty arises. 4 Furthermore,
the court stated that where the third-party suit results in a judgment
against the insured, the judgment operates as res judicata or collateral
estoppel in the insured's action against the insurer. The Supreme Court
of California reversed, holding that the insurer was obligated to
defend and, having failed to do so, must pay the judgment rendered
against the insured.
Zurich rejected two arguments of the insurer which are of particular interest. (i) The duty to defend is dependent upon the allegations
of the complaint so that the duty arises only when the complaint disdoses a cause of action which falls within coverage of the policy. The
court replied that the insurer must defend any suit which "potentially" seeks damages within the coverage of the policy.5 Since modern
procedure allows pleadings to be amended liberally, the court concluded that the third-party suit presented the potentiality of a
judgment based on negligence and that such liability was within
coverage of the policy. (2) The insurer's participation in the suit would
involve it in a conflict of interests. The insurer contended that if it
had defended it would have attempted to establish either that the
insured's liability rested on intentional conduct and, therefore, was not
within the coverage of the policy, or that the insured was free from
any liability. "Thus ...an insurer, if obligated to defend in this
situation, faces an insoluble ethical problem."6 The court replied that
the third-party suit does not involve the issue of coverage, the insured's liability being the only question litigated. Moreover, the
injured party desires only a large judgment and is not concerned
with the theory of liability. The court concluded that whether the
insured actually engaged in intentional conduct is not an issue which
is normally resolved in the third-party litigation. The rejection of the
insurer's arguments by the Supreme Court of California represents
a rejection of two established doctrines relating to the duty to defend.
Allegations of the Complaint
The rule is well established in most jurisdictions that the duty to
defend is determined by the allegations of the complaint filed by the
'Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 27, (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
5419 P.2d at 176.
6
1d. at 178.
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injured party.7 Basically, there are four situations which have confronted the courts in attempting to apply this rule: (i) where the complaint states upon its face that the action is clearly within or outside
the coverage of the policy; (2) where the complaint alleges two different causes of action, such as pleading negligence and intentional
injury in the alternative; (3)where the complaint is ambiguous as to
the grounds of recovery relied upon; (4)where there is a conflict between known facts and alleged facts.
A complaint that states clearly on its face that the action is outside the coverage of the policy is found in Harbin v. Assurance Co. of
America.8 The insurer brought a declaratory judgment action to
determine if it had a duty to defend an action brought against the
insured. The third-party complaint against the insured alleged that
the insured did "wilfully, maliciously and wrongfully assault, strike
and beat plaintiff with great force and violence." o The court held that
the terms of the policy determine the rights of the insured and require defense of suits "alleging" an injury covered by the policy.
Since the complaint alleged an injury not covered by the policy because of the intentional-injury exclusionary clause, there was no duty
to defend. The court recognized that under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure the outcome of a suit is not necessarily determined
by the pleadings; hence, at trial a claim based on unintentional conduct which is within the policy coverage may be established.' 0 If the
7

Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F.2d 748 (ioth Cir. 1962); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955); Journal Publishing Co. v.
General Cas. Co., 21o F.2d 202 (9th Cir. '954); McDonald v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,
224 F. Supp. 369 (D.R.I. 1963); Abbott v. Western Nat'l Indem. Co., 165 Cal. App.
2d 302, 331 P.2d 997 (Dist. Ct. App. x958); Blackwood v. Farley, 4o Misc. 2d 289,
243 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. 1963); MacDonald v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 21o Ore.
395, 311 P.2d 425 (1954); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Newsom, 352 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961); Wendall v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 123 Vt. 294, 187 A.2d 331
(1963); Aim v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 369 P.2d 216 (Wyo. 1962). For cases standing
for the general rule but involving a different exclusionary clause from that in Zurich
see C. Y. Thomason Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1950);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Crane, 94 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Mich. 195o); Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Dalton Coal & Material Co., 81 F. Supp. 895 (W.D. Mo. 1949); American Fid.
Co. v. Deerfield Valley Grain Co., 43 F. Supp. 841 (D. Vt. 1942).
83o8 F.2d 748 (1oth Cir. 1962).
9
lbid.
mlIbid. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for amendment of the pleadings during trial. Professor James in his treatise on civil procedure
in referring to the codes and the Federal Rules said:
Both systems look to the complaint to give the defendant and the court accurate factual notice. Neither system seeks to tie the pleader down to a
single legal theory. Under both systems a plaintiff is entitled to the benefit
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insured is held liable and if liability is based on grounds within the
policy coverage the insurer may be held liable for the judgment against
the insured. But the ultimate grounds are not determinative of the
duty to defend. Therefore, Harbin recognizes that even though the
insurer has no duty to defend it is not necessarily absolved from indemnifying the insured.
Superior Ins. Co. v. Jenkins" is illustrative of a complaint which
alleges both intentional and negligent conduct. The injured party
pleaded in the alternative, alleging in the first paragraph that the
insured intentionally inflicted an assault and battery and in the
second paragraph that he negligently injured him. The court rejected the insurer's contention that there was no duty to defend because intentional injuries were excluded from coverage. Since pleading in the alternative is permitted, the court held that the portion of
the complaint which alleges negligence sufficiently states a cause of
12
action within the coverage of the policy.
A situation involving an ambiguous complaint is illustrated in
Pow-Well Plumbing & Heating,Inc. v. Merchants Mut. Gas. Co.' 3 The
policy insured against liability for injuries caused by accident arising
out of the operations of the insured's business. The policy excluded
coverage for accidents attributable to the insured's operations "'if the
accident occurred after such operations had been completed at the
place of occurrence and away from ...premises of the insured.'

",14

The complaint charged the insured with negligence in installing a
gas burner which exploded causing injury. The complaint made no
mention of whether the insured was still working on the premises
at the time of the explosion, such allegation being determinative of
whether the alleged negligent act is within the coverage of the policy.
Holding that the duty to defend is to be determined by the allegations
of the complaint, the court described the complaint as unclear and
as presenting a question of doubt as to whether the accident was
covered by the policy. The court concluded that in such a situation
of any legal theory-the "whole law of the land"-applicable to the facts he
has alleged.
JAMES, CVIL PROCEDURE, § 2.11, 85-86 (1965).
1358 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
22See MacDonald v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 210 Ore.'395, 311 P.2d 425, 430 (1957),
where the court stated: "If in the pending case the injured parties had sued the
plaintiff by a complaint asserting both negligent injury and assault and battery,
a different problem would have been presented and it might have been the duty
of the insurer to defend...."
1195
Misc. 251, 89 N.Y.S.2d 469 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949).
"4Id. at 471.
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the insurer should defend if there is "potentially" a case within the
coverage of the policy and that such potentiality existed, since proof
could be offered that the insured was engaged on the premises at the
time of the accident. 15
Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America' 6 illustrates that where there
is a conflict between the facts as known or ascertainable by the insurer
and the allegations of the complaint, the complaint determines the
duty to defend.' 7 In Harbin,the court rejected the insured's argument
that had the insurer investigated it would have found that the conduct
was not intentional and, therefore, was within the coverage of the
policy. The court noted that whether the conduct was intentional
depended upon the intent of the tortfeasor and that such intent was
not to be determined by the insurer through investigation but by the
trier of the fact.' 8 However, other courts have held that facts known
or ascertainable by the insurer prevail over the complaint in determining whether there is a duty to defend. 19 In Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut.
"Accord, Boutwell v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 175 F.2d 597 ( 5 th Cir. 1949).
"3o8 F.2d 748 (loth Cir. 1962).
27Significantly, there are decisions from the same circuit which decided Harbin
that had held that the true facts prevail over the complaint in regard to determining the duty to defend. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 283 F.2d 648 (ioth Cir. ig6o); Albuquerque Gravel Prods. Co. v.
American Employers Ins. Co., 282 F.2d 218 (loth Cir. 196o); Hardware Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Hilderbrant, 119 F.2d 291, 299 (ioth Cir. 1941). Harbin distinguished these
cases on the ground that they sought to establish the insurer's liability after the
facts had been established while Harbin, being a declaratory judgment action,
sought to establish liability before the facts were established.
"However, the court in Harbin recognized that under modern procedural rules
the pleadings do not necessarily determine the issues and that recovery may be had
on grounds not asserted in the complaint. The court further said: "Accordingly,
paragraph 2 of the judgment of the court below is modified so as to declare that
the plaintiff insurer is not obligated at this time to defend [the] action .... " 3o8
F.2d at 75o. Therefore, Harbin implies that if the third party's claim changed so
as to come within the coverage of the policy a duty to defend would arise. See
Comment, 114 PA. L. REv. 734 (1966).
For case supporting the view that the duty to defend is determined by the
complaint, rather than by actual facts as known or ascertainable by the insurer see
Lamb v. Belt Cas. Co., 3 Cal. App. 2d 624, 40 P.2d 311 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935);
Boyle v. National Cas. Co., 84 A.2d 614 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1951); Fessenden
School, Inc. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 289 Mass. 124, 193 N.E. 558 (1935);
Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 77 N.E.2d 131 (1947) but see
United Waste Mfg. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 85 Misc. 539, 148 N.Y. Supp. 852
(Sup. Ct. 1914).
'"Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 307 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962); 'Marshall's
U.S. Auto Supply, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 354 Mo. 455, 189 S.W.2d 529 (1945);
United Waste Mfg. Co. v. Maryland Cas. CO., 85 Misc. 539, 148 N.Y. Supp. 852
(Sup. Ct. 1914); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 2o5 Okla. 618, 239 P.2d
754 (1951).
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Ins. Co.,20 involving a comprehensive homeowner's liability policy
containing an intentional-injury exclusionary clause, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the insurer had no
duty to defend a wrongful death action against the insured even
21
though the complaint filed by the administrator alleged negligence.
In Stout, the insured shot and killed a "Peeping Tom" and later
pleaded guilty to manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter is an intentional killing without malice, thus the court found that the plea of
guilty admitted that the death was intentionally caused. Since the
insured offered no evidence to rebut the admission, the insured had
placed himself outside the coverage of the policy and, therefore, there
22
was no duty to defend.
Conflict of Interests
A typical statement of the conflict of interests problem is made
in Harbin:
It [the insurer] cannot possibly defend the ... [third-party]
action and protect both its own interests and the interests of its
insureds. If it tries to exculpate itself by showing an intentional
injury, it exposes the insured to a greater liability and a possible
award of exemplary damages. If it urges an unintentional injury
23
it foregoes the exclusionary provision on the policy.
The leading authority on the conflict of interests doctrine is Farm
Bureau Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hammer.24 In Hammer, the insurer
sought a declaratory judgment that an automobile liability insurance
policy did not cover the damages suffered by those killed in an automobile struck by the insured, because the insured's act was intentional.
The complaint showed that the insured had been convicted of second
degree murder for intentionally and maliciously causing the death
of a passenger by driving his truck into the automobile in which the
passenger was riding. The insured argued that criminal conviction
was not binding as to the issue of noncoverage, that the civil suits
were brought against the insured on the theory of negligence, and that
judgments were recovered accordingly. The lower court held that
'03o7 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962).

21Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 201 F. Supp. 647, 650-51 (M.D N.C. 1962)
(The complaint alleged both intentional and negligent conduct.)
21n Stout the insured asserted that he entered the plea to avoid the possibility
of a prison sentence and not because of his guilt. The court stated that in view of
the record such an assertion was insufficient to rebut the plea. Stout v. Grain
Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 307 F.2d 521, 525 (4 th Cir. 1962).
2Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 3o8 F.2d 748, 749 (1oth Cir. 1962).
2A177 F.2d 793 ( th Cir. 1949).
4
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the insurer had a duty to defend the insured, which it had refused
to do, and was bound by the findings in the civil suits that the deaths
were due to the negligence of the insured. 25 The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court decision and held
that the insurer was not bound by the judgments in the civil suits.
The reversal was based on the existence of a conflict between the
interests of the insurer and the interests of the insured-that the insurer
could not defend the insured and at the same time protect its own
interest.
In holding that there was no duty to defend, the court in Hammer
found it necessary to take exception to the estoppel-by-judgment rule
that where an indemnitor has notice of and an opportunity to defend
an action against his indemnitee, a judgment, if obtained without
fraud or collusion, will be conclusive against him regardless of whether
he appeared in defense of the action. 26 Hammer recognized that the
purpose of the rule is to dispose of the necessity of two trials upon
the same issue: one by the third party against the indemnitee, and
the other by the indemnitee against the indemnitor. However,
Hammer held that the estoppel-by-judgment rule is applicable only
where the interests of the indemnitor and indemnitee are identical in
opposing the injured party's claim. 27 Moreover, the purpose of the
rule is accomplished by allowing the indemnitor to appear in the
third-party suit "on behalf of the indemnitee so that everything that
can be offered in exculpation of the indemnitee by either party to
the indemnity contract may be presented." 2s The obvious implication
is that at least where the interests of the indemnitor and indemnitee
"conflict" the rule does not apply. Before examining Hammer's justification for the conflict of interests doctrine, a judicial application of
the estoppel-by-judgment rule appears appropriate.
In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Maxwell29 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that when an insurance company defends the
insured 30 it is not bound by the judgment unless the ground upon
which the insured bases his claim against the insurer was "necessarily
-Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 83 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Va. 1949).
OSee Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896);
International Indem. Co. v. Steil, 3o F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1929); Campbell v. American
Fid. 9: Cas. Co., 212 N.C. 65, 192 S.E. 906 (1937); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 107 (1942);
1 FREEMAN, JuDmmNTs § 448 (5 th ed. 1925).
=177 F.2d at 799.
mIbid.
2 89 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1937).
wThe insured defended under a nonwaiver agreement. See notes 77-87 infra
and accompanying text.
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adjudicated" in the prior action. In Maxwell a doctor was insured
against liability for malpractice. The injured party brought an action
for malpractice and negligence for failure to care properly for an
injury which resulted in infection and subsequent amputation of his
leg. Judgment was entered in favor of the injured party. Upon failure
of the insured to satisfy the judgment, the injured party brought an
action against the insurer claiming that the judgment based on
negligence was binding on the insured. 31 The insurer's defense was
that the negligent act occurred prior to the effective date of the policy
and, therefore, was not covered by the policy. The court examined
the complaint filed against the insured and pointed out that the
alleged negligent acts constituted a course of conduct which began
prior to the effective date of the policy but extended into a period
after its effective date. Concerning the effect of the estoppel-by-judgment rule, the court said that the insurer was bound only by the issues
settled in the third-party suit. The issue decided in the suit against
the insured was not the same as the issue proposed against the insurer,
for in the latter suit the insurance company was liable only for
negligence that occurred between the effective date of the policy and
the terminal date of the negligent conduct. The issue decided in the
third-party suit was whether the insured had been negligent at any
time during treatment of the injury.
The estoppel-by-judgment rule as qualified by the "adjudicated
issues" requirement operates when the insurance company disclaims
liability and refuses to defend, as well as when it defends but refuses
to pay the judgment. In B. Roth Tool Co. v. New Amsterdam Gas.
Co. 3 2 the tool company was insured against liability for bodily injuries
sustained by its employees while on duty. An injured employee recovered a judgment against the insured. The insured then brought
an action against the insurer to recover the money paid. The insurer
answered that the insured had breached a stipulation in the policy
against keeping explosives on the premises and that such breach was
conclusively established by the judgment in the third-party suit. Upholding this contention the court said:
Brushing aside unnecessary verbiage, the issue in this case is
whether the tool company committed a breach... [of its
promise] that it would not use explosives on the premises.
"The insurance contract provided for an action by the injured party against
the insurer if the judgment against the insured was returned unsatisfied. 89 F.2d
at 989.The court held that the injured party stood in the place of the insured.
2161 Fed. 709 (8th Cir. 19o8).
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Whether it was using such an explosive at the time Cameron
was injured z3was the very issue tendered, met, and tried in the
former suit.
An exception to the estoppel-by-judgment rule was not made by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Miller v. United States
Fid. & Cas. Co. 34 involving facts similar to Hammer. In Miller the
insured was angry about the way in which Link passed him on the
highway. The insured thereupon turned in front of Link's car causing
him to lose control and run into an embankment. The insurance company refused to defend the action against the insured claiming that
the injuries were caused by the intentional conduct of the insured.
Link obtained a judgment against the insured who in turn brought
suit against the insurer for indemnity. After making an independent
finding of fact, the trial court held that the insured intentionally
caused the accident and that such conduct was outside the coverage
of the policy.35 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed, holding that the judgment in the third-party suit was based
on negligence and that the insurer was bound by that finding of fact
whether he defended or not. Moreover, to hold otherwise would require an insured to relitigate the same issues upon which he was found
liable in the third-party suit, thus defeating the very purpose of the
insurance policy, "protection against law suits and legal liability." 30
The situation presented in Miller is identical to that presented
in Hammer: (i) the insurer refused to defend and (2) the issue decided
in the third-party suit was identical to the issue determinative of
coverage or non-coverage.37 Miller held that the insurer was bound
by the determination in the third-party suit. However, Hammer
reached the opposite result relying upon the conflict of interests
doctrine. The primary justification for the conflict of interests doctrine
is found in the exception to the estoppel-by-judgment rule stated in
Freeman on Judgments38 only where the contract or relation to the
indemnitee imposes upon the indemnitor a duty to defend may the
judgment be held conclusive on the indemnitor. Moreover, the duty
to defend does not exist where the indemnitor would not be allowed
to litigate matters which would determine his liability to the indemni13Id. at 712.
31291

Mass. 445, 197 N.E. 75 (1935).

MId. at 76.
Id. at 77.

I1Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 83 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Va. 1949) (the
issue in both cases was whether the insured was negligent).
381 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 488 (5th ed. 1925).
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tee. To the same effect the indemnitor has no duty to defend "where
his showing himself not to be liable will not necessarily result in a
judgment in favor of the party asking him to defend." 39
This qualification of the duty to defend, which in turn prevents
application of estoppel by judgment, is illustrated in Raleigh & G.R.R.
v. Western & A.R.R. 40 In Raleigh the indemnitee was sued by the
Pullman Company for damages to one of its cars while on the premises
of the indemnitee. The suit was based on a contract under which
the indemnitee was bound to make repairs on Pullman cars damaged
while in the indemnitee's possession. The indemnitor was requested
to defend on the ground that it had negligently allowed one of its
cars to collide with the Pullman car and was therefore primarily liable.
The indemnitor refused to defend, and the indemnitee alleged that
the indemnitor was bound by the judgment. Holding that there was
no duty to defend, the court noted that the purpose of the estoppelby-judgment rule is to avoid a multiplicity of suits which can be
effected by requiring the indemnitor to appear in the third-party
suit and present any defense he might have. However, before the
indemnitor can be called upon to defend, the third-party suit must
be of such a nature that the indemnitor could present any defense
"which he could set up if the suit was proceeding against him
directly." 41 The court in Raleigh hypothesized that had the alleged
indemnitor entered the third-party suit and presented the defense that
it was without negligence such a defense could not be allowed to a
suit based on a contract wherein the indemnitee had agreed to pay all
damages irrespective of negligence. Moreover, if the indemnitee could
have defeated the action by proving that the contract with the third
party was void, the Pullman Company would not have been prevented
from suing the alleged indemnitor in tort for negligence; therefore,
the alleged indemnitor "would have gained nothing by appearing in
the original suit and defending it."42
'Id. at 982.
406Ga. App. 6M6, 65 S.E. 586 (19o9).
"'11d. at 588.

"Ibid. However, the court commented:
If in the present case the Raleigh & Gaston had contracted to pay all damages arising from negligence only, then it might be that Raleigh & Gaston
could properly have vouched the Western & Atlantic into court, since it was
the act of the latter which really caused the damage to the car. Or, if the
Western & Atlantic [indemnitor] had by contract agreed to indemnify the
Raleigh & Gaston for any liability which might arise by virtue of its contract with the Pullman Company, a simple case for vouching would be made
out.
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A similar illustration of the qualification of the duty to defend is
Pfarrv. Standard Oil Co. 43 In Pfarr a judgment was recovered against
a retailer of oil for injuries to the purchaser resulting from an explosion. The wholesaler refused to defend and the retailer alleged
that the wholesaler was bound by the judgment. The wholesaler's
liability turned on whether he could have appeared in the third-party
suit and succeeded in defending it by establishing that he was not
to blame. Holding the wholesaler, the court found that the wholesaler might have been free from fault and still the third-party could
have recovered because of the negligence of the retailer. The court
stated:
[O]ne not a party to a suit, but notified to appear and defend, must do so, if the negligence charged is such that, if
proved, would make it liable for the wrong done; but that it
need not do so if the defendant in the suit would be liable
for his own negligence, independent of any wrong on the part
of the person so notified ....[T~he case must be such that
his [wholesaler's] defense, if established, would be an end to the
suit ....If, in response to the notice, the defendant had appeared and offered to defend it could not interpose any defense
not personal to itself, and, by putting in such a defense, it
might have tendered a false issue, in so far as the original
case was concerned, thus complicating the issues and delaying
44
the trial.
Both Pfarr and Raleigh illustrate that the reason for the rule that
one "cannot be called upon to defend an action where his showing
himself not to be liable will not necessarily result in a judgment in
favor of a party asking him to defend" is that such a situation will
not satisfy the purpose of the estoppel-by-judgment rule: to avoid
multiple litigation.
Hammer relied upon this exception to the duty to defend in stating
its often cited rule that it was impossible for the insurer to defend
and simultaneously protect its own interests. 45 In addition, "it could
not exculpate itself by showing that the injurious acts of the insured
were beyond the scope of the policy, for this showing would establish
the liability of the insured ....
,46 However, it does not seem to follow
'3 65 Iowa 657, 146 N.V. 851 (1914). The court observed from the record of
the third-party action that recovery was based on the negligence of the retailer's
agents in not properly testing the oil after it received notice that some of it was
dangerous.
"Id.at 856 (1914).
45177 F.2d at 8oo-oi. See Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 201 F. Supp. 647,
649 (M.D.N.C. 1962).
"177 F.2d at 8oi.
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from Pfarrand Raleigh that the basis of the exception to the duty-todefend rule is to avoid prejudice to the indemnitee which is implicit
in Hammer's conflict of interests doctrine. Hammer's doctrine carries
the exception one step further in that "exculpation" of the indemnitor
would not only result in a judgment in favor of the insured but, in
addition, would actually establish the liability of the insured. The
indemnitor's assertion of non-liability would seemingly be prejudicial
to the indemnitee-establish the indemnitee's liability-only where
the issue which determines the liability of the indemnitee to the third
party is identical to the issue which determines the liability of the
indemnitor to the indemnitee. For example, in Hammer the issue
of negligence was determinative of the insured's liability to the
47
third party and the right of indemnity turned upon the same issue.
In such a situation a true conflict of interests exists, thus relieving the
insurer of the duty to defend, which in turn avoids operation of the
estoppel-by-judgment rule.
The conflict of interests doctrine should not be interpreted as assuming that the insurer's attorney could actually enter the suit and seek
to establish that the insured acted intentionally, thereby placing him
outside coverage of the policy. There are two objections to such a
course of conduct. (i) Generally, an insurance company cannot litigate
the issue of coverage in the third-party suit, for in most states it may
not be joined as a defendant. 48 (2) An assertion of intentional conduct in the third-party suit would be a violation of the attorney's duty
to his client.49 The conflict of interests doctrine, read in light of the
ethical objection, should be interpreted to mean only that when the
attorney is faced with the temptation of promoting his employer's
interest at the expense of the client-insured, he simply should not
defend the third-party suit. As said by one court: "The lawyer may not,
while bearing aloft the banner of his supposed client, at the same time
carry on battle against him, and it is his duty to withdraw from the
defense of ...[the] action...."50

Although conflict of interests has often been discussed solely in
terms of the ethical problem confronting the attorney, 51 the underlying
stimulus for the potentially unethical conduct, at least in intentionalunintentional liability insurance cases, is the estoppel-by-judgment
rule. If the attorney could not rely on the results of his conduct there
41See JAMEs, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.27 n.5 (1965).
"8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4861 (1962.)
49ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcS No. 6.

"OSchwartz v. Sar Corp., 19 Misc. 2d 66o, 195 N.Y.S.2d 496, 503 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
"See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. McConnaughy, 228 Md. 1, 179 A.2d 117 (1962).

1967]

CASE COMMENTS

283

would be no reason for him to assert a defense contrary to the interest
of the insured. Moreover, even if the attorney defended the insured
in a negligence action and complied with all the rules of ethical conduct but was unsuccesful in his defense, the estoppel-by-judgment
rule would establish the issue of negligence as conclusive against the
insurer, and it would therefore lose its policy defense. The conflict
obviously still exists.
To resolve this conflict Hammer offers the insurer two courses of
conduct: (i) refuse to defend and litigate the issue of coverage irrespective of the judgment in the third-party suit; 52 (2) defend but
3
reserve its own defense under a nonwaiver agreement.5
However, Zurich rejected the conflict of interests doctrine offered in
support of the argument that the insurer had no duty to defend. The
third-party complaint alleged intentional conduct. The argument was
to the effect that it would be in the best interests of the insurer, if it
could not completely absolve the insured of liability, to have the
judgment based on intentional conduct. The insured would desire a
judgment based on unintentional conduct, thus bringing his liability
within the coverage of the policy. In rejecting the doctrine the court
commented:
The only question there litigated [in the third-party suit] is
the insured's liability. The alleged victim does not concern himself with the theory of liability; he desires only the largest possible judgment. Similarly, the insured and insurer seek only to
avoid, or at least to minimize, the judgment. As we have noted,
modern procedural rules focus on whether, on a given set of
facts, the plaintiff, regardless of theory may recover. Thus the
question of whether or not the insured engaged in intentional
C3177 F.2d at 8oo (4th Cir. 1949). In Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 307
F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962), involving facts similar to Hammer, the court stated that
where a conflict exists the insurer should be free to litigate coverage irrespective of
the result of the third-party action. The court further stated:
This does not mean that by a mere assertion of a conflict of interest the insurer may excuse itself from its contractual obligation to defend. It means
only that, when there is an unresolved dispute as to the existence of this obgation the insurer is not required to participate in a tort proceeding where
the insurer's interest would be to prove a state of facts which would establish
or magnify the damaged party's claim against the insured. Simply, the law
will recognize the practicalities of the situation. But, if it should be later
determined that there is coverage, the insurer would be liable for the costs
of the defense.., as well as any judgment against him.
Id. at 523 n.i.
31 77 F.2d at 8oo (4 th Cir. 1949). See notes 77-87 infra and accompanying text
for discussion of nonwaiver agreement.
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conduct does not 54
normally formulate an issue which is resolved
in that litigation.
Implicit in the court's language is that it rejected the conflict of interests doctrine primarily because California is a "fact pleading" jurisdiction.5 In such a jurisdiction the theory of recovery as stated in the
pleadings is not controlling if sufficient facts are alleged to constitute
another ground for recovery. 56 Therefore, since only the liability of
the insured is determined in the third-party suit and such liability
could have been based upon either intentional or unintentional conduct, the grounds for liability cannot be determined from the judgment.5 7 This being true it would follow necessarily that any conflict
of interests is beyond identification. First, estoppel by judgment operates to make conclusive, in the suit between the indemnitor and
indemnitee, any issue litigated in the third-party suit material to that
judgment. Second, the conflict of interests arises when the right of
indemnity turns upon the same issue as did the third party's action
against the indemnitee. Thus, if the issue ,which determined liability is
unidentifiable, the basis for the conflict of interests is lost.
However, it is submitted that the reasoning in Zu'ich is oversimplified. Professor James in his treatise on civil procedure points out that a
general verdict rendered by a jury will often be "cryptic and ambiguous" and in such a situation collateral estoppel 5s would be of no
5'419 P.2d at 178.
14Buxbom v. Smith, 23 Cal. 2d 535, 145 P.2d 305 (1944); California W. States
Life Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 15 Cal. 2d 69, 98 P.2d 511 (194o).

16Note 59 supra.
6Zurich qualified its rejection of the conflict of interests doctrine with the
following statement:
In rare cases the issue of punitive damages or a special verdict might present
a potential conflict of interests, but such a possibility does not outweight
the advantages of the general rule. Even in such cases, however, the insurer
will still be bound, ethically and legally, to litigate in the interests of the
insured.
419 P.2d at 178 na8 (1966). The obvious implication is that a special verdict would,
by its very nature, reveal the grounds upon which recovery is based.
5It should be noted that the estoppel-by-judgment rule is often referred to
as res judicata or collateral estoppel. In reading cases concerning the binding effect
of a judgment on a later action between the indemnitor and indemnitee this overlap
of terms should be taken into consideration. See Graves v. Associated Transp. Inc.,
344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965) (res judicata); Travelers Indem. Co. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 33o F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1964) (collateral estoppel by judgment); Jarvis
v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 363 P.2d 74o (Ore. 1961) using terms res judicata and collateral
estoppel interchangeably). The term res judicata is not completely accurate since
the cause of action asserted in the third-party action is not the same as that
involved between the insurer and insured. Travelers Indem. Co. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 33o F.2d 250 ( 9 th Cir. 1964). Courts often use the term res judicata
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benefit to the party claiming it.59 A general verdict would probably
not reveal upon which issue liability was decided. 60 However, the
ambiguity may be resolved by admissible evidence, such as the pleadings and a transcript of the proceedings of the third-party suit. 61 In
62
addition, answers to special interrogatories would be admissible.
Where a case is tried to the court, specific findings of fact are often
made which frequently reveal the matters upon which the decision
was based.0 3 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the court
to make such findings. 64 Therefore, it is evident that the issues material
to the judgment in the third-party action are not in all cases beyond
identification.
Zurich apparently qualifies its rejection of the conflict of interas a generic term to include both the res judicata and collateral estoppel ideas.
FIELD & KAPLAN, MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 936 (1953). As said by Professor
James:
A person not named as a party may in fact take over the control of an
action, instead of or in co-operation with one of the parties. Where he does
so to protect some financial or proprietary interest that he has in the judgment or in the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the action, he will
be bound by the determinations of fact or law involved in the judgment
according to the rules of collateral estoppel.
JAzars, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.27, at 59o (1965). (Emphasis added.)
The objection to collateral estoppel that the insurer and insured were not
parties to the original suit is overcome because they are considered in "privy" with
each other. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sturgis, 198 Ark. 574, 129 S.W.2d 599 (1939); see
Development in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 855-56 (1952).
However, there is some authority that upholds the objection. E.g., State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 173 Va. 261, 3 S.E.2d 187 (1939) (estoppel by judgment
based on principle that a person should have only one opportunity to try his
case); 114 U. PA. L. Rv. 734, 740 (1966). But see, 4 OLA. L. REV. 125 (1951).
OJAEs, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.20, at 580 (1965).
OSee Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Bettinger, 111 F. Supp. 511, 515 (D. Minn.
1953). The insurer brought a declaratory judgment action to declare an automobile
liability policy void. The injured plaintiffs in the original suit were allowed to
intervene, and they claimed that the issue of ownership was established in the suit
against the insured. The court commented: "Examination of the record in the
prior trials does not disclose the basis for the Court's granting the motion for a
directed verdict. That being true, it cannot be said that it was sustained by the
Court on any particular ground."
aJAMES, CIvIL PROCEDURE § i1.19, at 579 (1965); see Jarvis v. Indemnity Ins.
Co. of No. America, 227 Ore. 508, 363 P.2d 740 (196i). It has been held that the
oral testimony of a juror or judge can be used to show what was put in issue,
Washington Steam Packet Co. v. Sickles, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 550 (1867), although
they are not permitted to testify as to the grounds upon which the jury based its
decision. JASSEs, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.20o, at 580, 1965).
uZurich admitted that a special verdict might present a conflict of interests.
419 P.2d
at 178 n.i8.
3
6 JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.20, at 580 (1965).
"FFD. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
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ests doctrine in stating that "in any event, if the insurer adequately
reserves its right to assert the noncoverage defense later, it will not be
bound by the judgment." 65 This reservation of right is often referred
to as a nonwaiver agreement whereby the insurer in defending the
third-party suit avoids operation of an estoppel or waiver 0 which
would preclude it from later setting up its defense of noncoverage. The
estoppel referred to here is based upon the equitable doctrine that one
"whose conduct has led another to act or not to act in reliance upon
a belief as to a fact or expectation as to future performance ought not
to be allowed to act in a way contrary to the belief or expectation so
created." 67 However, the nonwaiver agreement is subject to various
limitations: for example, normally consent of the insured is required
to make the agreement legally valid; 68 the insurer must give prompt
notice to the insured after obtaining knowledge of the possible defense; 69 and any defense known at the time of the agreement and not
stipulated by the insurer is waived.70 Thus, if these requirements are
71
not met any benefit of a nonwaiver is sacrificed.
Irrespective of these restrictions, there still appears some doubt as
419 P.2d at 178.
OCourts often use the terms "waiver" and "estoppel" interchangeably. 23 MD.
L. REv. 252, 256-57 (1963). However, the two terms are distinguishable.
The term 'waiver' is used sometimes broadly to indicate merely the
legal consequence that a particular defense by the insurer is not available
because of some conduct of it or its agents, and sometimes more narrowly
to mean 'an intentional relinquishment of a known right.' Even the latter
formula leaves the operative facts ('intention relinquishment') somewhat
nebulous. The term 'estoppel' always involves the notion of reliance by one
party (insured) upon the conduct of the other (insurer), and varies in
meaning with the kind of conduct of the latter, which may be either a representation of fact (estoppel by misrepresentation), a promise (promissory
estoppel) or merely 'taking a position', a manifestation of election.
PATrERSON AND YOUNG, CASES MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 531 (4th ed.
ig6i).
67PATrERSON, ESSENTrALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 96, at 493-94 (2d ed. 1957). "[WI]here

an insurance company defends an action and keeps control ...over it ...without
notice to the insured that it does not consider itself liable under the policy it is
estopped to deny its liability... but no estoppel arises where ...it insists on its
nonliability under the policy...." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 210
Ind. 561, 2 N.E.2d 989, 992 1936).
6'E.g., Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114, 179 A.2d 505 (1962).

6'E.g., Farrell v. Merchants' Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co., 2o3 App. Div. 118, 196
N.Y. Supp. 383, 385 (1922).

¢'E.g., John Alt Furniture Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 88 F.2d 36 (8th Cir. 1937).
71
'[T]he limited effect of a nonwaiver agreement appears in cases holding that
if the insurer's representative induces the insured to make any statement or do
any other act which he could not be required to do except on the assumption that
the insurer is to be liable to him, then the insurer is estopped to deny its liability."
PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW § io6, at 535 (2d ed. 1957).
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to whether a nonwaiver agreement will cure any conflict of interests
problem. The question is whether a nonwaiver agreement will prevent
application of the doctrine of estoppel-by-judgment or collateral
estoppel where the issue of liability in the third-party suit is identical
to the issue of coverage in the action against the insured. If the nonwaiver does not prevent application of the doctrine, the conflict of
interests would not necessarily be avoided, for the insurer by defending
might still forego his defense of noncoverage. In Maxwel 7 2 the court
took the unequivocal position that if an issue is necessarily adjudicated
in the third-party suit and defended under a nonwaiver it is conclusive
73
upon the parties in the suit against the insurer.
The Minnesota decision of Newcomb v. Meiss,74 involving facts
similar to those in Zurich, clearly illustrates that the conflict of interests problem is not cured by a nonwaiver. In Meiss the insured stopped
at a traffic light behind the automobile driven by third-party plaintiff. The insured thereupon permitted his car to strike the rear of
plaintiff's car. The plaintiff got out of his car and, while inspecting
the damage, the insured hit him with a tire iron. While the insured
was leaving the scene of the accident his automoble struck the plaintiff
who was still standing in the road. The insured was convicted of
assault. The complaint filed in the civil action alleged negligence and
the plaintiff recovered on this theory. On appeal the insurer's attorney,
who defended under a nonwaiver, urged that the judgment against
the insured should be reversed because the trial court refused to
instruct on the issue of intentional tort. In the lower court action the
attorney moved for a directed verdict claiming that any liability
should be based on intentional conduct. In refusing the instruction the
trial court judge commented:
I do not believe [defense counsel] is in a position now to insist
upon a finding of willful or intentional tort. If the jury held
it was an intentional tort, and this was an issue in the case,
[and] if the defendant sued the insurance company it could be
set up as an estoppel by verdict. Counsel would thus be appearing in the interest of the insurance company, and not that
of defendant.73
72Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 89 F.2d 988, 991 (4th Cir. 1937).
7It is to be noted that Maxwell was decided prior to Hammer, the latter case
suggesting a nonwaiver as one method of avoiding a conflict of interests by allowing
the insurer to present his defense in a subsequent proceeding. However, the authority
relied upon by Hammer was a case where the issue which would establish coverage
was not litigated in the third-party suit, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Coughran, 303 U.S. 485, 492 (1938).
74116 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 1962).
7Id. at 597. (Emphasis added.)
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The supreme court on appeal noted that counsel for the defendant
had insisted throughout the trial that the action was one for assault
and battery. Therefore, the defendant should prevail. The argument of
counsel was that there was a distinction between intentional and negligent conduct and that although the insured was liable he should be
held so upon the correct theory. Counsel further argued ,that if he were
successful in establishing intentional injury the insured would not be
liable because the statute of limitations had run.76 The court did not
question counsel's good faith in asserting the defense but noted that
counsel apparently had assumed that the court would not amend the
7
complaint to allow recovery upon the ground of intentional conduct. "

However, the court was of the opinion that had counsel succeeded in
establishing intentional conduct, the trial court, in the interest of
justice would have amended the complaint and thus deprived the
insured of the right to indemnity. 73 The court said:
This case points up the danger which defense counsel may
encounter by defending under a reservation of rights under circumstances where the defense may not be consistent with the
interests of both the insurer and the insured.... The misunderstanding between counsel and the court. .. might well have
been avoided if the liability of the insurance 79company had been
properly determined in separate proceedings.
The bizarre situation in Meiss certainly illustrates that the estoppel-byjudgment rule may cause a conflict of interests regardless of the existence of a nonwaiver or reservation of rights.
On the other hand, the recent decision of Great Am. Ins. Co. v.
•RatlifisO lends some support to the Zurich position concerning
nonwaiver and the conflict of interests doctrine. In Ratliff the insured
ran his car into plaintiff's car one or more times causing it to overturn
thus injuring plaintiff. The insurer unsuccessfully defended the negligence action under a nonwaiver agreement relying on the policy
"'The court pointed out, however, that the statute of limitations factor was
not discussed at the trial level. Ibid.
'Apparently the attorney's argument was that since the complaint alleged
negligence, a finding of intentional conduct, which constitutes a different theory
of recovery, would impose no liability on the insured. The trial court judge had
indicated to counsel for the insured that no amendment would be allowed. Id.
596-97 n.1.
78The court noted that the statute of limitations for intentional tort had not
run as of the time the action began and that any amendment would date back to
the time the negligence action was instituted. Id. at 598 n.e.
"Old. at 598.
n 2 4 2 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
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clause which excluded intentional injury caused by the insured.5 ' In
the declaratory judgment action brought by the insurance company the
court pointed out that a judgment operates as res judicata or collateral
estoppel as between all parties and their privies as to issues adjudicated
in the third-party action. Furthermore, the very nature of the insured's conduct was put in issue because the judge refused plaintiff's
82
request to have the issue of punitive damages submitted to the jury.
However, the court relied upon the conflict of interests argument in
holding that the insurer could litigate the question of coverage irrespective of the judgment in the third-party suit. The court said that
the insurer probably had an affirmative obligation to defend and in so
doing could not assume a position adverse to the insured. Ratliff lends
support to the contention of Zurich as to the effect of nonwaiver in the
sense that the insurer may defend under a nonwaiver and not be bound
by the judgment. On the other hand, Ratliff emphasizes that the
reason that the judgment is not binding is because of the conflict of
interests, and not because of the nonwaiver. Ratliff and Meiss clearly
illustrate that a nonwaiver agreement will not cure a conflict of interests problem unless such an agreement precludes operation of estoppel
by judgment or collateral estoppel, and not merely equitable estoppel.
Conclusion
Zurich rejected two defenses of the insurer relative to the duty to
defend primarily because of the flexibility of modern rules of pleading. According to Zurich the insurer can no longer rely on the allegations in the complaint to determine whether it has a duty to defend,
at least in intentional-unintentional tort cases, nor may it rely on the
conflict of interests argument. Thus, Zurich has a profound effect on
the intentional-injury exclusionary clause when read in connection
with the provision wherein the insurer agrees to defend any suit "alleg"'Following the accident the injured party caused a warrant to be issued for
the arrest of the insured charging him with assault with intent to kill. However the
civil proceeding took place before the accused was brought to trial. Three days
after the incident the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging intentional injury. Seven
months later the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging negligence. The
court inferred that the plaintiff became aware of the exclusionary clause and
may have amended so as to bring the judgment within the coverage of the policy.
Id. at 985-86.
I-rThe court in Ratliff commented:
The action of the Circuit Judge in refusing to submit the issue of punitive
damages is somewhat puzzling in view of the testimony of Ratliff in the State
Court that Holland deliberated and repeatedly drove his pickup truck into
the rear of the Ratliff vehicle and bumped and pushed that vehicle for
about two miles down the highway.
Id. at 989 n.4.
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ing" injury payable under the policy. The insurer can no longer rely
on the exclusionary clause to be relieved of its duty to defend the
insured. The insurer must defend; however, if the insurer can obtain a
valid nonwaiver agreement it may still litigate the issue of coverage
in a subsequent suit. Therefore, the exclusionary clause is still effective
as to the ultimate liability of the insurer. Yet, it is submitted that
the insurer's dilemma is not cured even under a nonwaiver unless the
latter precludes operation of estoppel by judgment.
The Zurich holding, requiring the insurer to defend even where
the injury was intentionally inflicted, may be justifiable since it gives
primary consideration to the interest of the insured for whose benefit
the contract was entered into. Yet this "guaranteed legal services view"
has one weakness. The insurer may be able to obtain a declaratory
judgmentss determining the issue of policy coverage prior to the rendition of the judgment in the third-party action. In such actions some
courts have considered only the question of the duty to defend stating
that the insurer may still be ultimately liable under the policy,8 4 but
others have adjudicated the issue of coverage-whether the insured
acted intentionally.8 5 The Supreme Court of the United States held that
the injured third-party is a proper defendant in a declaratory judgment
action brought by the insurer.8 6 Seemingly, if coverage is adjudicated
in an intentional-unintentional injury situation, a verdict in favor of
the insurer might, on principles of collateral estoppel, operate to hold
the insured liable to the injured third-party. This possibility has led
one court to comment that the declaratory judgment action should be
allowed only after the third-party suit has proceeded to judgment.8 7
Assuming that a declaratory judgment action is available, the insured
cannot always rely upon the insurer coming to his defense.
RONALD K. INGOE
L. Rav. 798, 801-02 (1950).
E.g., Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, go8 F.2d 748 (ioth Cir. 1962).
"E.g., Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 307 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962).
m'Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 (1941).
8See 3 VAND.

8

8-Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D. Ark. 1965). The court
stated:
In many instances it is... in the best interests of all parties concerned to have
the question of coverage litigated in advance of the trial ... between the
insured and the injured party. However... advance determination of the
matter of coverage is not desirable where... that question is closely and
directly connected with the issue of the insured's personal liability to the
injured party.
If this case had been tried first, and if the Court had found that...
[insured] intentionally injured... [third party] that decision, on settled principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, might have established ...
[insured's] substantive liability to ... [third party]."

